[mche] Def CalNorthstate Univ.Decl.by P.AUSTIN In Sprt.of Mot.for Summ.Adjud.on 1st,2,3,4,6&7 Causes of Act - Document February 16, 2023 (2024)

Case

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. vs GEBRAI

Aug 07, 2024 |Christopher E. Krueger |(Breach of Contract/Warranty) |Limited Civil |24CV015761

Case

CITIBANK N.A. vs PADILLA

Aug 06, 2024 |Christopher E. Krueger |(Breach of Contract/Warranty) |Limited Civil |24CV015612

Case

MIKERIN vs FCA US LLC

Case

ROMERO, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY CO...

Aug 08, 2024 |Richard K. Sueyoshi |(Breach of Contract/Warranty) |Unlimited Civil |24CV015840

Case

KERN vs FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION

Aug 08, 2024 |Thadd A. Blizzard |(Breach of Contract/Warranty) |Unlimited Civil |24CV015838

Case

34-2023-00337523-CU-BC-GDS

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Breach of Contract/Warranty) |34-2023-00337523-CU-BC-GDS

Case

SANDFORD vs LONG, et al.

Aug 06, 2024 |Richard K. Sueyoshi |(Other Commercial/Business Tor...) |Limited Civil |24CV015688

Case

WHITE vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Ruling

SANDERS vs ARCPE 1, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Other Real Property (not emin...) |24CV008962

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV008962: SANDERS vs ARCPE 1, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other to Stay Unlawful Detainer Action in Department 54Tentative RulingPlaintiff Linda Sanders’ (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Sanders”) motion to stay unlawful detainer action orin the alternative to consolidate is DENIED as follows.This is an action to set aside a non-judicial foreclosure and for declaratory relief arising out ofthe non-judicial foreclosure sale of property located at 236 Edelweiss Way, Galt, CA 95632 (the“Property”). (See, generally, First Am. Compl.)Ms. Sanders filed the Complaint on May 7, 2024, and the operative First Amended Complaint onJune 5, 2024 (“FAC”). She alleges in the FAC, in pertinent part: 5. Plaintiff’s ex-husband, Willie Sanders, executed a Promissory Note and a Deed of Trust in favor of Harborside Financial Network, Inc. when he was the sole owner of the Property. Ms. Sanders is not a signatory to either the note or deed of trust. 6. Subsequently, in or about 2010, Mr. Sanders deeded an interest in the Property to Ms. Sanders and that deed was recorded with the Sacramento County Recorder's Office. 7. After Mr. Sanders filed for bankruptcy, the Deed of Trust became a Zombie Mortgage. That is, neither Harborside or any subsequent assignee of the Deed of Trust provided the monthly statements required under 15 USCA 1638 and 12 CFR 7026.7. 8. At some point in time, the note and Deed of Trust were purchased by ARCPE [1, LLC (“ARCPE”)] and Mr. Sanders apparently defaulted under the note. 9. However, even though Ms. Sanders was on title to the Property and ARCPE had constructive notice of her interest in the Property, she was not provided a Notice of Default and Intent to Sell and she was never served a Notice of Trustee Sale all in violation of Civil Code § 2924b. . . . .... 11. In or about 2024, ARCPE conducted a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the Property and purchased the Property under a credit bid. Page 1 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV008962: SANDERS vs ARCPE 1, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other to Stay Unlawful Detainer Action in Department 54 12. Thereafter, ARCPE served a notice to vacate on all occupants of the Property. This is when Ms. Sanders learned that the Property had been sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. . . . ARCPE is now seeking to evict Ms. Sanders from the Property.(FAC ¶¶ 5-12.)As referenced in Ms. Sanders’ allegations, ARCPE sought to obtain possession of the Propertyafter the foreclosure sale. It filed a verified complaint for unlawful detainer against Ms. Sanderson April 11, 2024. The unlawful detainer (“UD”) action is captioned ARCPE 1, LLC v. Sanders;its case number is 24UD02344.In the instant motion, Ms. Sanders seeks an order staying the UD action or, in the alternative,consolidating the two cases since this action concerns title and equitable rights in the sameproperty as the UD action.Ms. Sanders filed this motion on May 9, 2024. Since that time, default judgment has beenentered against her in the UD action. (See Judgment – Unlawful Detainer, July 22, 2024 in24UD02344.[1]) Review of the UD action’s register of actions reflects that Ms. Sanders demurredto the UD action on May 10, 2024. The Honorable Stephen Lau overruled the demurrer on June10, 2024, and ordered Ms. Sanders to file an answer by June 18, 2024 by 4:00 p.m. (OrderRegarding Demurrer, June 11, 2024 in 24UD02344.) Judge Lau’s Order stated that if Ms.Sanders “fails to answer, a default may be requested and a default judgment be entered.” (Ibid.)Default was entered against Ms. Sanders in the UD action on July 19, 2024, and judgment wasentered by the clerk by default (possession only) on July 22, 2024.[2] The judgment states thatARCPE “is entitled to possession of the [Property].” (Judgment – Unlawful Detainer, July 22,2024 in 24UD02344 at p. 2.)As judgment has been entered in the UD action, there is nothing to stay or consolidate with thisaction. Accordingly, the motion is denied as moot.Further, the Court notes that Ms. Sanders filed this motion in the wrong department and/oraction. To the extent the motion sought a stay of the UD action, Ms. Sanders did not provide anyauthority to support that this Court has the authority to stay the earlier-filed UD action. Further,motions to consolidate are to be heard by the Presiding Judge. (See Local Rule 1.05 [Unlessotherwise directed by the Presiding Judge, in civil and limited civil actions, all motions forconsolidation . . . shall be heard by the Presiding Judge.”].)For the stated reasons, Ms. Sanders' motion is denied.This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (CodeCiv. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.) Page 2 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV008962: SANDERS vs ARCPE 1, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other to Stay Unlawful Detainer Action in Department 54[1] The Court takes sua sponte judicial notice of the filings in the UD action.[2] “The clerk’s entry of default cuts off the defendant's right to take furtheraffirmative steps such as filing a pleading or motion, and the defendant is not entitled tonotices or service of pleadings or papers. ‘A defendant against whom a default isentered is out of court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affectingplaintiff's right of action.’ Thus, the defendant may not, until the default is set aside in aproper proceeding, file pleadings or move for a new trial, or demand notice ofsubsequent proceedings. If the judgment were vacated it would be the duty of the courtimmediately to render another judgment of like effect, and the defendants, still being indefault, could not be heard in opposition to it. (6 Witkin Cal. Proc. Proceedings WithoutTrial (2024) § 215 [citing cases].)NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter Page 3 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV008962: SANDERS vs ARCPE 1, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other to Stay Unlawful Detainer Action in Department 54services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 4 of 4

Ruling

IN THE MATTER OF: ROBERT BRILEY

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Other Civil Petition) |24CV012926

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV012926: IN THE MATTER OF: ROBERT BRILEY 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other for Relief From Financial Obligation During Military Service in Department 54Tentative RulingPetitioner Robert Briley’s petition for relief from financial obligations during active militaryservice is UNOPPOSED and GRANTED.Pursuant to Military & Veterans Code § 409.3, subdivision (a), a service member may apply to acourt for relief "in respect of any obligation or liability incurred by the service member beforethe effective date of the orders for his or her most current period of military service or in respectof any tax or assessment whether falling due before or during his or her most current period ofmilitary service.”As a result, the Court finds it appropriate to stay Petitioner's financial obligation with LoanCareLLC, as his ability to pay that obligation has been materially affected by reason of his militaryservice.Petitioner's obligation is ordered stayed and deferred during his active service. (Mil. & Vet.Code, § 409.3 (d)(1).)The Court will sign the amended proposed order submitted with the moving papers.NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Page 1 of 2 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV012926: IN THE MATTER OF: ROBERT BRILEY 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other for Relief From Financial Obligation During Military Service in Department 54Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 2 of 2

Ruling

NAIK, et al. vs FEITSER, et al.

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Petition to Compel/Confirm/Va...) |24CV004065

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV004065: NAIK, et al. vs FEITSER, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Petition to Confirm, Correct, or Vacate Contractual Arbitration Award (Alternative Dispute Resolution) in Department 54Tentative RulingPlease see the Court's ruling on the related matter in this case on today's calendar. Page 1 of 1

Ruling

Guy Reed vs. Jeff Will

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Other Real Property (not emin...) |34-2019-00262592-CU-OR-GDS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2019-00262592-CU-OR-GDS: Guy Reed vs. Jeff Will 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to File Fifth Amended Complaint in Department 54Tentative RulingPlaintiffs Guy Reed and Rebecca Reed’s (“Plaintiffs”) motion for leave to file a Fifth AmendedComplaint is UNOPPOSED and GRANTED.[1]As stated in Plaintiffs’ moving papers, they seek “to amend their pleading according to proofbased upon Defendants' wrongful conduct on Plaintiffs' property, including removing landscapeboulders and spray painting Plaintiffs' driveway, side yard, and fence for which this Courtgranted a preliminary injunction, since Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint was filed onOctober 10, 2022.” (Not. of Mot. & Mot. 2:1-5.) Plaintiffs’ counsel declares: 14. I moved as promptly as I could to get this motion . . . on file with the Court under the circ*mstances. The parties were attempting to negotiate a settlement between January and March 2024, but settlement discussions have since stalled, thus making it apparent that this motion for leave to amend is necessary. I understand that [Defendants’ counsel] is currently in trial, but I wanted to get this motion on the Court’s calendar as soon as possible. 15. No one is prejudiced by the filing of this Fifth Amended Complaint. No depositions of the parties have been taken as of yet. Good cause exists to allow Plaintiffs’ Complaint to be amended so that all material issues between the parties are tried at the same time.(Am. Decl. of Karen M. Goodman ISO Mot. ¶¶ 14-15.) The Court notes that trial was recentlycontinued in this case until December 3, 2024. (Minute Order July 19, 2024.)Plaintiffs shall file and serve a “clean” version (i.e., not redline) of the proposed Fifth AmendedComplaint attached as Exhibit B to the Amended Goodman Declaration[2] no later than August16, 2024. (Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiffs are directed to present theclerk with a copy of this ruling at the time they files the Fifth Amended Complaint to facilitate itsfiling.)//////This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Page 1 of 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2019-00262592-CU-OR-GDS: Guy Reed vs. Jeff Will 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to File Fifth Amended Complaint in Department 54Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)[1] Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice filed in support of the motion is unopposedand granted.[2] Plaintiffs may change the trial date listed on the proposed Fifth AmendedComplaint to reflect the new trial date.NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf. Page 2 of 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2019-00262592-CU-OR-GDS: Guy Reed vs. Jeff Will 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to File Fifth Amended Complaint in Department 54A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 3 of 3

Ruling

34-2022-00314631-CU-PA-GDS

Aug 08, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Motor Vehicle - Personal Inju...) |34-2022-00314631-CU-PA-GDS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00314631-CU-PA-GDS: Stella Burden vs. Bobby Harper 08/09/2024 Hearing on Motion for New Trial in Department 27Tentative RulingMANDATORY APPEARANCE REQUIRED.The parties may appear by Zoom by either using the link below or calling in with the meeting ID,no password is required. https://saccourt-ca- gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept27 SIP Address: (833) 568-886427 Judge George 16120204632@sip.zoomgov.com ID: 16120204632 Parties requesting services of a Court Reporter will need to arrange for private Court Reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code § 68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a Court Reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by using the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf. If a Court Reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list is not used, aStipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) must be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing. Once the form is signed, it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 27. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a Court Reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 39 at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the Clerk of Department 27 will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official Court Reporter will be provided. Page 1 of 2 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO34-2022-00314631-CU-PA-GDS: Stella Burden vs. Bobby Harper 08/09/2024 Hearing on Motion for New Trial in Department 27 Page 2 of 2

Ruling

MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ...

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Breach of Contract/Warranty) |24CV006536

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54Tentative RulingDefendant Hyundai Motor America’s (“Hyundai”) motion to compel arbitration and stay actionis DENIED as follows.BackgroundPlaintiff Geoffrey Johnsen Malveaux (“Plaintiff”) filed this Lemon Law action against Hyundaiand San Leandro Hyundai Kai (“SLHK”) on July 18, 2023, arising out of his purchase of a 2020Hyundai Elantra (the “Subject Vehicle”) on October 6, 2020.Plaintiff alleges three causes of action against Hyundai for violations of the Song-BeverlyConsumer Warranty Act (the “Song-Beverly Act”): (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach ofimplied warranty; and (3) violation of section 1793.2 of the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff allegesthat the Subject Vehicle came with express and implied warranties from Hyundai. (Complaint, ¶¶9, 10.) Plaintiff alleges the Subject Vehicle was delivered with serious defects andnonconformities to warranty, including electrical, structural, and engine defects. (Complaint, ¶11.) Plaintiff alleges a negligent repair cause of action against SLHK. (Complaint, ¶¶ 59-63.)Plaintiff has not sued the selling dealership.The Subject Vehicle came with a copy of Hyundai’s Owner’s Handbook & WarrantyInformation (the “Warranty Booklet”), which contains an arbitration agreement that states, inpertinent part: BINDING ARBITRATION FOR CALIFORNIA VEHICLES ONLY PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use of your vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representation in the warranty, or duties contemplated under the warranty . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration . . . even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law.(Declaration of Jordan A. Willette (“Willette Decl.”) ¶ 3, Ex. B at p. 13.)When Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle, he also entered into a contract with the sellingdealership (Sacramento Hyundai) titled “Retail Installment Sale Contract – Simple FinanceCharge (With Arbitration Provision)” (the “RISC”). (Willette Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.) The RISC Page 1 of 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54contains an arbitration agreement that states, in part: Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort or statute... between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.(Willette Decl. Ex. A, p. 7.)Hyundai moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Warranty Booklet on the groundsPlaintiff’s claims are based upon Hyundai’s warranty obligations. In the alternative, Hyundaialso moves pursuant to the RISC on the grounds of equitable estoppel, citing to Felisilda v. FCAUS LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486.Legal StandardCalifornia has a public policy which encourages arbitrations and courts have repeatedly approvedand upheld arbitration clauses. (See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9[California has a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relativelyinexpensive means of dispute resolution”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17Cal.3d 699, 707 [California’s statutory scheme “evidence[s] a strong public policy in favor ofarbitrations ... [as a] favored method of resolving disputes”]; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206Cal.App.3d 771, 775; Berman v. Dean Witter Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003; Greenfield v.Mosley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 735, 744.)“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compelarbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and FamilySvcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes toarbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at 1518.)“In a petition to compel arbitration, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden ofproving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.[Citation.] The party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of theevidence any fact necessary to its defense, including that an arbitration provision is invalid orotherwise not enforceable.” (Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Servs., Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th314, 325.)A written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocableconsistent with standard contract principles. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Badie v. Bank of Page 2 of 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 787.) Included among these is the long-accepted rule thatambiguities in an arbitration agreement, as in any other type of contract, must be interpretedagainst the drafting party. (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745-747.)Non-signatories generally may not compel contractual arbitration. (See JSM Tuscany, LLC v.Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-1237.) However, there are exceptions wherearbitration agreements may be enforced by a non-signatory. Nonparties asserting a party’s rightsmust show some basis for extending the agreement to them. (Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993)17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1728.) Further, a "third party" non-signatory may enforce an arbitrationagreement only through the grounds available under state contract law, such as agency, alter ego,or intended benefit. (See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle (2009) 556 U.S. 624, 631.) UnderCalifornia law, a non-signatory may assert a third-party beneficiary theory (see, e.g., Thornton v.Career Training Center, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 116). Non-signatories may also enforcearbitration agreements through the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (See, e.g., MolecularAnalytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696 [claims assertedagainst non-signatory "intimately intertwined" with contract containing arbitration clause].).Discussion[1]A. Warranty BookletHyundai argues Plaintiff’s claims against it are subject to arbitration pursuant to the WarrantyBooklet, which includes the arbitration agreement set forth above and which also sets forth thefollowing language: “This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us (including our affiliated companies) relating to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use of your vehicle, or the vehicle warranty subject to arbitration to the maximum extent permitted by law. .... IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT-OUT@HMAUSA.COM WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION. Page 3 of 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54(Willette Decl., Ex. B pp. 13-14.)Hyundai argues: “Given that Plaintiff purchased his vehicle in California, is bringing this actionpursuant to [the] warranty, and ha[s] alleged that repairs have been performed under thewarranty, it is clear the arbitration provision applies.” (Mem. of P.&A. ISO Mot. (“MPA”) 8:15-18.) Hyundai further argues that it may compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitableestoppel because Plaintiff is asserting claims directly based upon the warranty. (MPA 8:19-23.)The Court finds that Hyundai has failed to show an agreement to arbitrate exists pursuant to theWarranty Booklet. Neither Hyundai, nor Plaintiff, signed the Warranty Booklet. In fact, there isno signature line anywhere for any party to accept its terms. The Warranty Booklet simplyexplains the terms of the warranty, with an opt out option if the buyer so chooses. In Norcia v.Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3d 1279, the Ninth Circuitfound that an arbitration provision in Samsung’s warranty handbook with an opt out provisionwas not enforceable as to the plaintiff. After analyzing California law, the Court found that theplaintiff did not expressly assent to any agreement in the brochure. Nor did [plaintiff] sign the brochure or otherwise act in a manner that would show 'his intent to use his silence, or failure to opt out, as a means of accepting the arbitration agreement. [citation.] Under California law, an offeree's inaction after receipt of an offer is generally insufficient to form a contract. [citation]. Therefore, Samsung’s offer to arbitrate all disputes with [plaintiff] “cannot be turned into an agreement because the person to whom it is made or sent makes no reply, even though the offer states that silence will be taken as consent,” [citation], unless an exception to this general rule applies.(Norcia, supra, at p. 1286.) The Ninth Circuit further reasoned, "Nor would a reasonable personunderstand that receiving the seller's warranty and failing to opt out of an arbitration provisioncontained within the warranty constituted assent to a provision requiring arbitration of all claimsagainst the seller, including claims not involving the warranty." (Id. at p. 1290.) The sameanalysis applies here. The Warranty Booklet does not operate as a contract with an enforceablearbitration agreement.Further, Plaintiff have presented evidence that he never signed the Warranty Booklet, was nevergiven notice by Hyundai or the selling dealership that an arbitration provision existed inside theWarranty Booklet, or that he was required to opt-out of this arbitration agreement within 30 daysof the purchase. He only became aware of the arbitration provision by this instant motion tocompel arbitration. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7.) Plaintiff also did not rely on the Warranty Booklet in Page 4 of 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54asserting his claims and, instead, relied on the representations made by the selling dealership andpublicly available information concerning Hyundai’s express warranties. (Id. at ¶ 8.)B. The RISCIn the alternative, Hyundai moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the RISC on the grounds ofequitable estoppel, citing to Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 486. Hyundai is not a party to theRISC or the arbitration provision. However, Hyundai contends they have standing to enforce theagreement because Plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined with the underlying contractualobligations and arise out of the purchase of the Subject Vehicle.Plaintiff relies on Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company (Ford Motor Warranty Cases) (2023) 89Cal.App.5th 1324, which created a split of authority regarding a non-signatory manufacturer’sability to compel arbitration in Lemon Law actions, as well as Kielar v. Hyundai Motor America(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614, in which the Third District Court of Appeal joined in recent decisionsthat disagreed with Felisilda and concluded the trial court erred in ordering arbitration. Asdiscussed further below, the Court opts to follow Ochoa and Kielar.In Felisilda, the plaintiffs brought Lemon Law claims against the vehicle manufacturer and itscertified dealer. The trial court ordered the plaintiffs’ claims against both defendants toarbitration, even though the manufacturer was not a party to the sales contract that contained thearbitration provision at issue. In affirming the trial court, the Felisilda court concluded that thearbitration provision applied to claims against the manufacturer based on equitable estoppelbecause the plaintiffs’ claims against the manufacturer were based solely on the warrantiescontained in the sales contract. The court stated: “The Felisildas’ claim against FCA directly relates to the condition of the vehicle that they allege to have violated warranties they received as a consequence of the sales contract. Because the Felisildas expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle – even against third party nonsignatories to the sales contract – they are estopped from refusing to arbitrate their claim against FCA. Consequently, the trial court properly ordered the Felisildas to arbitrate their claims against FCA.”(Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 497.)The Ochoa case involved several Lemon Law actions against only the manufacturer that wereconsolidated into one action. In affirming the trial court’s denial of the manufacturer’s motion tocompel arbitration, the Ochoa court expressly declined to follow Felisilda and concluded thatequitable estoppel did not apply because the plaintiffs’ claims were not founded in the salecontract. Specifically, in its discussion of Felisilda, the Ochoa court stated: Page 5 of 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54 That the Felisilda plaintiffs and the dealer agreed in their sale contract to arbitrate disputes between them about the condition of the vehicle does not equitably estop the plaintiffs from asserting FCA has no right to demand arbitration. Equitable estoppel would apply if the plaintiffs had sued FCA based on the terms of the sale contract yet denied FCA could enforce the arbitration clause in that contract. (Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 495-496.) That is not what the plaintiffs did in Felisilda.(Ochoa, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1334.)The Ochoa court also rejected the Felisilda court’s broad interpretation of language in thearbitration agreement related to claims against third parties, specifically the provision thatpermitted arbitration of any claim or dispute arising out of the “ ‘purchase or condition of thisvehicle, the cont[r]act or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any suchrelationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) ... .’ ” (Ochoa, supra, 89Cal.App.5th at p. 1334.) This language was found in the arbitration agreements in both Felisildaand Ochoa, and is identical to the language in the arbitration provision in the RISC in this case.Regarding this language, the Ochoa court stated, “We do not read this italicized language asconsent by the purchaser to arbitrate claims with third party nonsignatories. Rather, we read it asa further delineation of the subject matter of claims the purchasers and dealers agreed toarbitrate.” (Id. at pp. 1334-1335.)In concluding that the plaintiff’s Lemon Law claims were not founded in the sale contract, theOchoa court noted that although many of the plaintiffs referred to the contract in their complaintsand even occasionally attached it as an exhibit, “no plaintiffs alleged violations of the salecontracts’ express terms. Rather, plaintiffs’ claims are based on FMC’s statutory obligations toreimburse consumers or replace their vehicles when unable to repair in accordance with itswarranty. ... Not one of the plaintiffs sued on any express contractual language in the salecontracts.” (Ochoa, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1335.) The Ochoa court also noted that the salecontracts did not contain any warranties, finding that “the substantive terms of the sale contractsrelate to sale and financing and nothing more.” (Ibid.) The court also rejected the manufacturer’sargument that California law treats all warranty claims as contract claims, citing to Greenman v.Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57 and Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Churchof Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Cavanaugh (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 492 (Cavanaugh).Ultimately, the Ochoa court concluded: But, contrary to FMC’s assertion, it does not “naturally follow” from any contractual character of manufacturer warranty claims that they inhere in a retail sale contract containing no warranty terms. Following Greenman, supra, 69 Cal.2d 57, and Cavanaugh, supra, 217 Cal.App.2d 492, independent manufacturer warranties are not part of, but are independent from, retail sale contracts. Page 6 of 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54 Again, the “fundamental point” of using equitable estoppel to compel arbitration is to prevent a party from taking advantage of a contract’s substantive terms while avoiding those terms requiring arbitration. (Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 496.) Plaintiffs’ claims in no way rely on the sale contracts. Equitable estoppel does not apply.(Ochoa, supra, at p. 1336.)The Ochoa opinion was published on April 4, 2023. On July 19, 2023, the California SupremeCourt granted review while noting that Ochoa “may be cited, not only for its persuasive value,but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that wouldin turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 [20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937], to choose between sides of anysuch conflict.” (Ochoa v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Ford Motor Warranty Cases) (July 19, 2023,S279969) 2023 Cal. LEXIS 4235.)Given the conflict between Felisilda and Ochoa and the Supreme Court’s statement in itsopinion granting review of Ochoa, the Court has discretion to choose which case to follow. Here,the Court follows Ochoa. The Court notes that this case is factually nearly identical to Ochoa,including the language of the respective arbitration clauses, the lack of warranties in therespective sale contract, and the fact that the selling dealership is not a party to this action.Additionally, like the plaintiffs in Ochoa, Plaintiff’s claims are not founded on the RISC, asPlaintiff does not allege any breach of the RISC’s terms. Instead, Plaintiff’s claims “are based on[Hyundai]’s statutory obligations to reimburse consumers or replace their vehicles when unableto repair in accordance with its warranty.” (Ochoa, supra, at p. 1335.) Indeed, Plaintiff has not“sued on any express contractual language in the sale contract[].” (Ibid.) (See generally,Complaint.)The choice to follow Ochoa is also supported by the Third District Court of Appeal’s recentdecision in Kielar, which also declined to follow Felisilda. Kielar involved a writ of mandatechallenging the trial court’s decision to grant Hyundai Motor America’s motion to compelarbitration of Mr. Kielar’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act. The Kielar court concluded thetrial court erred in ordering arbitration because Kielar’s claims did not rely on any terms of theRISC and, thus, equitable estoppel did not apply to the situation. (Kielar, supra, 94 Cal.App.5that p. 620.) The Kielar court stated: “Kielar's complaint alleges ‘Hyundai issued a writtenwarranty.’ This warranty was not part of his sales contract with the dealership. Indeed, the salescontract acknowledges this separate warranty and disclaims any implied warranties by thedealership[.]” (Ibid.) Thus, the Kielar court concluded the manufacturer’s warranties thataccompany the sale of a vehicle without regard to the terms of the RISC between the purchaserand the dealer are independent of the RISC. (Ibid.) Lastly, the Kielar court found, similar toOchoa, that the parenthetical language in the arbitration provision referring to non-signatorythird parties was only a delineation of the subject matter of claims the purchasers and dealers Page 7 of 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54agreed to arbitrate. (Ibid.)Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes Hyundai does not have standing to enforce theRISC’s arbitration provision as a non-signatory under an equitable estoppel theory. Hyundaidoes not argue that is has standing under any other theory.C. ConclusionFor the stated reasons, Hyundai’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules ofCourt, rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.[1] Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted. Plaintiff’s objections to evidence areoverruled.NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Page 8 of 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV006536: MALVEAUX vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 54Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 9 of 9

Ruling

34-2022-00329242-CU-OE-GDS

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Other Employment Complaint Case) |34-2022-00329242-CU-OE-GDS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00329242-CU-OE-GDS: Gurmail Kaur vs. Kamal Chand 08/08/2024 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 54Tentative RulingPlaintiff Gurmail Kaur’s (“Plaintiff”) demurrer to the 19th and 20th affirmative defenses allegedin Defendants’ Answer to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is SUSTAINED with leave toamend, as follows.BackgroundThis action arises out of work Plaintiff performed for the Defendant Sacramento Bhartiya SabhaChurch Corporation dba Sacramento Laxmi Narayan Temple (the “Temple”). Plaintiff filed theoriginal complaint in November 2022 against the Temple and individual Defendants KamalChand, Surendra Singh, and Ablash Singh (collectively “Defendants”). The Complaint allegedcauses of action for several Labor Code (wage and hour) violations along with humantrafficking, financial elder abuse, breach of oral contract, intentional infliction of emotionaldistress, and false light.Following discovery and the depositions of Plaintiff and the individual Defendants, Plaintiff fileda motion for leave to amend in February 2024 to allege additional causes of action for maliciousprosecution and abuse of process, based on the individual Defendants conduct in evictingPlaintiff from the Temple’s housing where she had been living. That motion was unopposed andgranted, and Plaintiff filed the operative FAC on April 17, 2024.Defendants filed an Answer to the FAC on May 17, 2024 (“Answer”). The Answer allegestwenty affirmative defenses. Plaintiff demurs to the 19th and 20th affirmative defenses, whichstate: AS AND FOR AN NINETEENTH, SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant alleges that as volunteer officers or directors, any liability is limited pursuant to Civil Code section 5800. AS AND FOR AN TWENTYTH, SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant alleges that they are entitled to immunity as set forth in California Corporate Code section 7231.(Answer 5:16-22.)Legal Standard“Code of Civil Procedure section 431.30, subdivision (b) provides that an answer to thecomplaint ‘shall contain,’ in addition to a ‘general or specific denial’ of the complaint’sallegations, ‘[a] statement of any new matter constituting a defense.’” (Harris v. City of Santa Page 1 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00329242-CU-OE-GDS: Gurmail Kaur vs. Kamal Chand 08/08/2024 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 54Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 239.) “The phrase ‘new matter’ refers to something relied on by adefendant which is not put in issue by the plaintiff. Thus, where matters are not responsive toessential allegations of the complaint, they must be raised in the answer as ‘new matter.’” (Dep’tof Finance v. City of Merced (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 286, 294 [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted].) “Such ‘new matter’ is also known as ‘an affirmative defense.’” (Ibid.[internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) “Where, however, the answer sets forth factsshowing some essential allegation of the complaint is not true, such facts are not ‘new matter,’but only a traverse.” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d721, 725.)A party may file a demurrer to an answer on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient toconstitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).) A demurrer to an answer follows thesame general rules as a demurrer to a complaint. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226Cal.App.2d 725, 732.) Thus, only the contents on the face of the answer are considered, andfactual allegations are accepted as true, butlegal conclusions are not. (Ibid.)Affirmative defenses must be pled in the same fashion, and with the same specificity, as a causeof action in a complaint. (Dep’t of Finance v. City of Merced, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 294;FPI Development, Inc. vs. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384; Mountain AirEnterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 756.) The critical pleadingrequirement is that the answer alleges the facts on which it is founded. (See California Trust Co.v. Gustason (1940) 15 Cal.2d 268, 273.)As with a cause of action, an affirmative defense must be pleaded with ultimate facts. (5 WitkinCal. Procedure (2024), Pleading, § 1122.) Terse legal conclusions will not generally survivedemurrer. (FPI Development, Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 384; Quantification SettlementAgreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758, 813.)DiscussionPlaintiff demurs to the 19th and 20th affirmative defenses on the basis that they “fail to statefacts sufficient to constitute a defense and are uncertain.” (Demurrer 2:3-5.)In essence, Plaintiff argues that these affirmative defenses are conclusory and lack any facts tosupport their application. (See, e.g., Mem. of P.&A. ISO Demurrer (“MPA”) 6:17-7:2, 8:2-8.)Defendants opposes the demurrer, in part. They state that the 19th affirmative defense “wasinadvertently included in the Answer” and concede that it should be stricken. (Opp’n 5:9-14.)However, they respond that the 20th affirmative defense is not a “new matter” and, therefore,does not need to be plead with any further specificity. (Opp’n 5:16-6:15.) Page 2 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00329242-CU-OE-GDS: Gurmail Kaur vs. Kamal Chand 08/08/2024 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 54The Court disagrees. Corporations Code section 7231 is referred to as a statutory “businessjudgment rule,” which sets forth the “statutory standard of care” that “applies to parties(particularly shareholders and creditors) to whom . . . directors owe a fiduciary obligation.”(Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass’n (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 506; Ritter & Ritter, Inc. v.The Churchill Condominium Ass’n (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 103, 122 [referring to CorporationsCode section 7231 as “a statutory business judgment rule”].) Business judgment rules are viewedas affirmative defenses. (See, e.g., Ekstrom v. Marquesa at Monarch Beach HOA (2008) 168Cal.App.4th 1111, 1123 [“Just as the corporate business judgment rule, which is a rule of judicialdeference to good faith management decisions of corporate boards, is a defense (citation), so toois the rule of judicial deference to decisions of homeowner association boards . . . .”].)Accordingly, Defendants were required to allege facts to support its application. However, theAnswer fails to allege any facts to support the defense’s applicability in this case. Defendantsallege simply that “they are entitled to immunity as set forth in California Corporate Codesection 7231.” This allegation fails to state sufficient facts to set forth the defense.For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s demurrer is sustained in its entirety. Leave to amend is grantedas to the 20th affirmative defense since this is the first challenge to Defendants’ Answer.Defendants may file and serve a First Amended Answer to the FAC no later than August 19,2024. Although not required by statute or court rule, Defendants are directed to present the clerkwith a copy of this ruling at the time they file the First Amended Answer to facilitate its filing.This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (CodeCiv. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either Page 3 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00329242-CU-OE-GDS: Gurmail Kaur vs. Kamal Chand 08/08/2024 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 54telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 4 of 4

Ruling

34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Other Personal Injury/Propert...) |34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records in Department 54Tentative RulingThe Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as requiredby Local Rule 1.06(D). Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith toadvise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If moving counselis unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, they shall be available at the hearingin the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule1.06(B).Plaintiff Mayra Barrera’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to quash Defendant Dr. Jeffrey A. Saladin, DentalCorporation dba Children’s Choice Pediatric Dental Care’s (“Defendant”) Subpoena forProduction of Business Records served on Chartwell Staffing Solutions (“CSS”) is ruled upon asfollows.BackgroundThis is a personal injury action arising out of a slip and fall incident that occurred on January 6,2020, when Plaintiff was present at Defendant’s dental clinic. The operative First AmendedComplaint alleges causes of action for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium.Plaintiff claims she sustained significant injuries to her head, neck, left shoulder, back, and kneeas a result of the incident. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Form Interrogatories, Set One (“FI Resp.”), Nos.6.1-6.7, attached as Ex. A to Opp’n; Pl.’s Supp. Resp. to Form Interrogatories, Set One (“Supp.FI Resp.”), No. 6.7, attached as Ex. B to Opp’n.) Plaintiff also claims loss of income. (FI Resp.No. 8.1; Supp. FI Resp. Nos. 2.6, 8.2-8.8.) Her discovery responses state that she was notemployed at the time of the incident, that she worked from August – November of 2020 at CSSas a Warehouse Assistant, and that she has not worked since November 2020. (Supp. FI Resp.Nos. 2.6, 8.2, 8.4-8.6.) Prior to the incident, Plaintiff’s last employment had been in 2015. (Supp.FI Resp. No. 8.3.) Plaintiff claims she will lose income in the future as a result of the incidentbecause her “severe spinal and knee injuries will affect her ability to work.” (Supp. FI Resp. No.8.8.) Plaintiff did not provide a substantive response to Form Interrogatory No. 8.7, which askedher to state the total income she has lost to date as a result of the incident (and how the amountwas calculated). (Supp. FI Resp. No. 8.7.) Plaintiff has not provided any documents to supporther wage loss claim. (Decl. of Dora Gamero ISO Opp’n (“Gamero Decl.”) ¶ 5.)Plaintiff’s supplemental responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, set one, disclosed thatPlaintiff was involved in an incident at CSS, which caused pain to her low back. (Gamero Decl. ¶8; Supp. FI Resp. No. 10.3.) “As discovery has continued, Defendant[] became aware thatPlaintiff’s incident at [CSS] was . . . significant,” and “caused her to seek emergency care andcaused her to take time off work.” (Gamero Decl. ¶ 9; see also medical records attached as Ex. Cto Opp’n.) Page 1 of 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records in Department 54In June 2023, Defendant served the subject Deposition Subpoena for Production of BusinessRecords to the Custodian of Records for CSS (“Subpoena”). The Subpoena seeks: Any and all documents and records, and all writings, including, but not limited to, employment, payroll and applications for employment, work absence and incident reports, personnel records, pre-employment exam records and progress reports, pertaining to [Plaintiff’s] employment.(Subpoena, attached as Ex. A to Mot.) Plaintiff’s counsel was served with a copy of theSubpoena on June 18, 2024. (Decl. of Justin Farahi ISO Mot. ¶ 4.)DiscussionPlaintiff moves to quash the Subpoena on the basis that it “seeks employment records inviolation of [her] right to privacy.” (Not. of Mot. & Mot. (“Mot.”) 2:4-8, 4:25.) Plaintiff arguesthat the Subpoena “is extremely overbroad in light of the privacy rights implicated.” (Id. at 5:16.)In the alternative, Plaintiff states the Court should issue a protective order effectively limiting theSubpoena “so that [it] would cover only those records directly relevant to the Incident and thelegal matter of the lawsuit.” (Id. at 6:3-6.) Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions. (Id. at 7:3-6,7:11-13.)Defendant[1] opposes the motion, rejoining that the Subpoena is “directly relevant to the issues inthe instant Litigation and [is] required so that Defendant[] can fully assess Plaintiff’s damages.”(Opp’n 2:4-6.) Defendant argues: Given the uncertainty of Plaintiff’s wage loss claim and her failure to provide proper and adequate responses [to written discovery], Defendant[] had no option but to subpoena Plaintiff’s employment and wage loss records. Also, given Plaintiff’s work-related injury, which is the likely cause of her wage loss (and could have contributed to her damages), it is Defendant’s position that any work-related document is relevant, as Defendant[ is] entitled to know if there are any additional causes/reasons for Plaintiff’s wage loss. (Gamero Decl. ¶ 12). Lastly, given that Plaintiff’s employment with [CSS] began in August 2020, seven (7) months after the incident, any possible invasion into Plaintiff’s privacy is very minimal. As such, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiff’s motion to quash be denied. (Gamero Decl. ¶ 13).(Opp’n 4:15-23.) Page 2 of 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records in Department 54Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, the Court: [M]ay make an order quashing [a] subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon such terms or conditions as the court shall declare including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the parties, the witness, the consumer, or the employee from unreasonable demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the witness, consumer, or employee.“ ‘In general, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that isrelevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of anymotion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appearsreasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., §2017.010.)’ [Citation.]” (County of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 638-639.) However, “ ‘[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by aconstitutional ... privilege ... [including] ... the right to privacy ... .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 639.)“The California Constitution (Cal Const art I, § 1) creates ‘a zone of privacy’ that protectsagainst unwarranted compelled disclosure of private or personal information and extends to aperson’s confidential financial affairs as well as to the details of an individual’s personal life.[Citations.] [¶] This right to privacy protects an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacyagainst a serious invasion. [Citations.]” (Cal. Judges Benchbook: Civ. Proceedings – Discovery(Cal. CJER Sept. 2022 Update) § 4.140.) Like medical records, a person’s employment recordsare within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court(1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528-530, disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. SuperiorCourt (2017) 3 Cal.5th 557.)Unlike an evidentiary privilege, a person’s constitutionally-protected right to privacy “isqualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy againstthe need for discovery [citation].” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure BeforeTrial (The Rutter Group 2024 update) ¶ 8:294 [citing cases].) “The showing required toovercome the protection depends on the nature of the privacy right asserted; in some cases, asimple balancing test is sufficient, while in others, a compelling interest must be shown.” (Ibid.)“Only obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by acompelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557.)“In determining whether . . . discovery . . . would violate state constitutional privacy rights,[courts] must apply the framework the California Supreme Court established in Hill v NationalCollegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7 C4th 1, 26 CR2d 834.” (Cal. Judges Benchbook, supra, at ¶4.146 [citing County of Los Angeles, supra, at pp. 629, 640].) Under Hill, a party who alleges an Page 3 of 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records in Department 54invasion of must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) an objectively reasonableexpectation of privacy in the circ*mstances, and (3) conduct by the defendant that constitutes aserious invasion of privacy. (Mathews v Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 769.) The party seekingdiscovery of the subject information “may prevail by negating any of these three elements or bypleading and proving that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers oneor more countervailing interests. The [party asserting a privacy invasion] may then rebut the . . .assertion of countervailing interests by showing that there are feasible and effective alternativesto [obtain the information] that have a lesser impact on [their] privacy interests.” (Cal. JudgesBenchbook, supra, at ¶ 4.416 [citing Mathews, supra, and Hill, supra].)“The court must then ‘carefully balance’ the interests involved: i.e., the claimed right of privacyversus the public interest in obtaining just results in litigation.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 8:323[citing cases] [emphasis omitted].) “ ‘The court must consider the purpose of the informationsought, the effect that disclosure will have on the affected persons and parties, the nature of theobjections urged by the party resisting disclosure and availability of alternative, less intrusivemeans for obtaining the requested information. [Citation.]’ ” (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. SuperiorCourt (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 754-755.) “ ‘Based on an application of these factors, themore sensitive the nature of the personal information that is sought to be discovered, the moresubstantial the showing of the need for the discovery that will be required before disclosure willbe permitted. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 755.)“The party asserting a privacy interest has the burden of establishing its extent and theseriousness of the prospective invasion. Against this showing, the judge must weigh thecountervailing interests the opposing party identifies.” (Cal. Judges Benchbook, supra, at § 4.146[citing Williams, supra, 3 Cal. 5th at p. 557].)Applying these legal standards, the Court finds that the Subpoena does not improperly intrudeupon Plaintiff’s right to privacy. Although Plaintiff has a legally protected privacy interest in heremployment records, Defendant’s proffered interests in favor of disclosure outweigh her right toprivacy in this case based upon the motion record. The scope of records at issue is minimized byPlaintiff’s length of employment with CSS (4 months). Also, Defendant has shown the difficultyit has encountered in trying to obtain information concerning Plaintiff’s wage loss claim by lessintrusive means.For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to quash is denied.[2] Defendant’s request for monetarysanctions (Opp’n 9:6), is unsupported by evidence and is denied.This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required.(Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)[1] The Court notes that the opposition is filed by Defendant and co-defendant CC Page 4 of 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records in Department 54Amulet Management, LLC. However, the Subpoena was issued only by Defendant. CCAmulet Management, LLC has not shown how it has standing to oppose the motion.Therefore, the Court limits its discussion to the opposition as made by Defendant.[2] The Court notes that Plaintiff states in her moving papers that compliance withthe Subpoena is impossible because “Chartwell Staffing Solutions, with address at 1300Oliver Road, Suite 280, Fairfield, CA 94534, no longer exists.” (Separate Statement ISOMot. 2:17-21.) To the extent this statement is true, Plaintiff has not shown how it is abasis for her to seek to quash the Subpoena.NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- Page 5 of 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records in Department 5413.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 6 of 6

Ruling

34-2023-00337523-CU-BC-GDS

Aug 07, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Breach of Contract/Warranty) |34-2023-00337523-CU-BC-GDS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2023-00337523-CU-BC-GDS: Tawana Ragsdale vs. Nissan North America, a Delaware Corporation 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53Tentative RulingNOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing Page 1 of 2 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO34-2023-00337523-CU-BC-GDS: Tawana Ragsdale vs. Nissan North America, a Delaware Corporation 08/08/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 53or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.TENTATIVE RULING:This matter is DROPPED from calendar at the request of the moving party.This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (CodeCiv. Proc. §1019.5; CRC, Rule 3.1312.) Page 2 of 2

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